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Coercion by the Numbers:
Conditional Spending Doctrine
and the Future of Federal
Education Spending
Abstract
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court for the first time deemed
a federal spending program unconstitutionally coercive. This decision
transformed the coercion principle from a mere rhetorical device into
a legitimate restraint on federal conditional spending. Specifically, the
coercion principle addresses the risk that Congress will use its
spending power to subvert state regulation in areas in which states
have a reserved right to regulate. As this principle has developed over
recent decades, federal spending for elementary and secondary
education has steadily increased.
This Note applies the Court’s reasoning from NFIB to No Child
Left Behind, which remains the primary piece of federal education
legislation, and concludes that a strong case exists for finding federal
education spending unconstitutionally coercive. Such a case resonates
with the rationales underlying the coercion principle. Long-term
trends in education spending are then considered to show that
coercion will likely become a genuine issue in the near future, even as
Congress enacts new education legislation. Finally, this Note discusses
federal involvement in education and makes two legislative
recommendations for absolving coercion issues.
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Introduction
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1
(NFIB), often dubbed the “health care decision,” the Supreme Court
took an unprecedented step in striking down an exercise of
congressional conditional spending as unconstitutionally coercive.2
However, the long-term ramifications of this holding remain unsettled.
While pushing the conditional spending doctrine forward, the Court’s
three opinions leave many questions unanswered. How exactly does
the Court judge coercion? At what point does “pressure turn[ ] into
compulsion?”3 Are other conditional spending programs vulnerable?
This Note addresses those questions. More specifically, it
examines how conditional spending for education may likewise be
1.

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

2.

Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

3.

Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
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deemed unconstitutionally coercive under the Supreme Court’s new
conditional spending jurisprudence. Part I reviews the relevant history
of the conditional spending doctrine, finishing with the Medicaid
portion of the recent health care decision. Part II outlines the
evolution of the federal government’s involvement in education and
the spending schemes associated with that involvement. Part III
briefly reviews the federal courts’ application of the conditional
spending doctrine to federal education spending. Part IV employs the
analysis from the health care decision to conclude that modern
congressional conditional spending for education violates the coercion
principle. Part V concludes this Note by observing the problems
associated with federal involvement in education and offers
recommendations for reconciling federal education spending with the
coercion principle.

I.

Conditional Spending Doctrine

Congress regularly makes federal funds available to states and
localities provided that the recipients comply with certain conditions.
An instrument of cooperative federalism, conditional funding benefits
state and federal officials alike. State representatives avoid the
perception that their sovereignty has been undermined by national
programs, while setting in motion initiatives that presumably benefit
their citizens.4 Congress benefits in terms of efficiency and increased
popular acceptance of its policies by those opposed to a wide-reaching
federal bureaucracy.5 Over time, conditional funding grants have
proven to be a popular policy tool. As Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito—the dissenting Justices—noted in NFIB,
Congress increasingly grants money to states to accomplish its
legislative objectives.6
But the increased legislative popularity of such conditional
spending obscures its drawbacks, notably the undermining of political
accountability and the circumventing of limits on federal power.7 As
4.

Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid at 5, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-400).

5.

Id. (explaining that Congress benefits “by spending the federal money
through States rather than new federal instrumentalities”).

6.

See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2658 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (citing G. Ross Stephens & Nelson Wikstrom,
American Intergovernmental Relations: A Fragmented
Federal Polity 83 (2007)) (acknowledging the large increase of federal
aid in absolute terms and as a percentage of state and local
expenditures: from 11.6% in 1950 to 37.5% in 2010).

7.

Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L.J. 557,
573–74, 584 (2000) (asserting that cooperative federalism arrangements,
which include conditional spending schemes, erode political
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American political institutions continue to
funding, greater attention should be dedicated
issues it raises. This Part tracks the Supreme
these issues and identifies where the Court’s
jurisprudence stands today.
A.

embrace conditional
to the constitutional
Court’s treatment of
conditional spending

Development of Conditional Spending Jurisprudence

Congress’s power to spend money for the general welfare traces
back to the Spending Clause.8 Nearly a century and a half after the
Constitution’s adoption, however, the basic meaning of the clause
remained open to debate. In the midst of the New Deal, the Supreme
Court weighed two divergent stances on whether the spending power
stands alone as a separate power, distinct from the other enumerated
legislative powers.
In United States v. Butler,9 the Court decided this issue and
adopted an expansive view of the spending power.10 According to
James Madison, the Constitution limits the power of Congress to
spend only in support of its other Article I powers; in contrast,
Alexander Hamilton viewed the Spending Clause as authorizing a
separate power subject only to the broad limitation of furthering the
general welfare.11 By definitively adopting Hamilton’s view, the Court
greatly enhanced the federal government’s ability to spend, especially
in light of the Court’s admitted reluctance to second-guess Congress.12
Taking advantage of Butler’s broad interpretation of its spending
power, Congress began to steadily increase its use of conditional
spending to prompt and influence state action.13 But the Supreme

accountability
federalism).

and

sidestep

the

constitutional

principle

of

dual

8.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States . . . .”).

9.

297 U.S. 1 (1935).

10.

Id. at 65. The Court held the taxing authority at issue under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), to
be unconstitutional because it regulated intrastate agricultural
production in violation of the Tenth Amendment. However, the Court
undermined Butler’s Tenth Amendment holding just two years later.
See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937).

11.

Butler, 297 U.S. at 65–66.

12.

Id. (reasoning that adopting Madison’s minimalist view would render
the Spending Clause’s “general welfare” language a “mere tautology”).

13.

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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Court shed little light on the topic for decades following the Butler
decision.14
The conditional spending doctrine’s development did not begin in
earnest until 1981 in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman.15 In Pennhurst, residents of a state-operated facility for
people with mental retardation asserted a claim under the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,16 a
federal grant program aimed at creating state programs to assist the
developmentally disabled.17 Specifically, residents alleged that the
facility failed to provide the minimum living conditions detailed in the
Act’s “bill of rights” provision.18
The Supreme Court attacked the provision’s language for failing
to express that compliance with it served as a condition for the
receipt of federal funds under the Act.19 Articulating a rare restraint
on conditional spending, the Court analogized congressional
conditional spending to contract law. Drawing from the concept of
mutual assent, the Court asserted that the spending power depends
“on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of
the ‘contract.’”20 Thus, Congress must unambiguously express any
condition on federal grants to states, or the courts will decline to
enforce it.21
Though Pennhurst limited Congress’s ability to attach conditions
to its spending, it represented the exception rather than the rule.
South Dakota v. Dole22 most completely articulates the modern
conditional spending doctrine before NFIB and exemplifies the wide
deference traditionally accorded to Congress in exercising its spending
power. In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Dole Court
14.

But see, e.g., Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 135–
36 (1947) (recognizing Congress’s ability to fix the terms of funding
granted to the states); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316–17 (1968)
(same).

15.

451 U.S. 1 (1981).

16.

Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)).

17.

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5–6, 11.

18.

Id. at 6, 12–13.

19.

Id. at 12–13 (distinguishing the bill of rights provision,
42 U.S.C. § 6010, from §§ 6005, 6009, 6011, and 6012). The Court
upheld other provisions of the Act that clearly conditioned federal
assistance on taking certain actions to facilitate the employment of
people with disabilities.

20.

Id. at 17.

21.

Id.

22.

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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upheld legislation that withheld a percentage of federal highway funds
from states that set their minimum legal drinking ages below twentyone years.23
Rehnquist outlined the basic framework for evaluating conditional
spending, holding that conditions are valid as long as they satisfy four
requirements.24 First, the spending must advance the “general
welfare.” Second, as established in Pennhurst, the condition must be
expressed unambiguously. Third, the condition must relate to federal
interests in the spending program. Fourth, the spending cannot
violate any other constitutional provision. In applying the framework,
the Dole majority controversially found that the drinking age
condition “directly related” to the funding’s purpose of improving the
safety of interstate travel.25 By categorizing the seemingly tenuous
relationship between minimum drinking ages and highway funding as
direct, the Dole Court displayed significant deference to Congress in
crafting funding conditions.26
More important, however, the Court trumpeted an independent
concern for congressional coercion. The Court expanded on language
from Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,27 an earlier case in which the
Court found that a condition did not cross “the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.”28 A half century after that decision,
23.

Id. at 206. The legislation at issue was 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (allowing
the Secretary to withhold funds if the legal purchase, possession, or
drinking age is below twenty-one years).

24.

Id. at 207–08.

25.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09. But see id. at 212–15 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s application of the relation
requirement while approving the majority’s framework).

26.

See Michele Landis Dauber, Judicial Review and the Power of the
Purse, 23 Law & Hist. Rev. 451, 452–53 (2005) (positing that the
Supreme Court has exercised vast deference towards congressional
spending since before the beginning of the twentieth century).
Commentators have criticized not only Dole’s “directly related”
reasoning but also later applications of that reasoning to conditions that
bear a looser relation to the federal interest in the spending. See, e.g.,
Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 447–50 (2005)
(attacking court decisions upholding the Clean Air Act’s conditions on
federal highway funds as sufficiently related to the federal interest of
environmental protection).

27.

301 U.S. 548 (1937).

28.

Id. at 590. However, the Court doubted whether courts could determine
with any precision the point at which a condition becomes coercive. For
a conceptual explanation of coercive conditional spending and a related
analytical framework, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without
Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 Geo.
L.J. 1 (2001).
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Dole asserted that in certain circumstances federal conditional
spending may turn from permissible encouragement into
unconstitutional coercion.29 In evaluating coercion, the Supreme Court
emphasized that South Dakota would lose only five percent of the
funds otherwise available under the highway program, a very small
percentage of the state’s total expenditures for all purposes.
Therefore, the Court described the condition as “relatively mild
encouragement.”30
Four years later, the Supreme Court delved deeper into the
rationales underlying coercion. In New York v. United States,31 the
constitutionality of three sets of incentives under the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 198532 was at stake.
The first set of incentives, the “monetary incentives,” awarded states
for achieving a series of waste-disposal milestones from a fund
financed by a portion of surcharges paid by states exporting nuclear
waste. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dole framework by using it
to find that this portion of the Act was a valid exercise of conditional
spending.33 After the Court rejected the argument that the form of
accounting for these expenditures violated the spending power, it
upheld an otherwise straightforward exercise of conditional spending.34
Nonetheless, the Court struck down another piece of the statute
that imposed a negative incentive on states that did not regulate
according to Congress’s instructions.35 The “take title” provision gave
states the option of either regulating in line with Congress’s
instructions or, alternatively, taking title and possession of the waste
and bearing the liability for all damages suffered by waste generators.
This provision, the Court found, unconstitutionally crossed the line
from encouragement to coercion.36

29.

Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.

30.

Id.

31.

505 U.S. 144 (1992).

32.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2021b–2021j (2006).

33.

New York, 505 U.S. at 171–73.

34.

See id. at 172 (responding to petitioner’s argument that keeping the
funds in an account separate from the general treasury violates
Congress’s spending power, Justice O’Connor stated, “[t]he
Constitution’s grant to Congress of the authority to ‘pay the Debts and
provide for the . . . general Welfare’ has never . . . been thought to
mandate a particular form of accounting”).

35.

Id. at 174–75.

36.

Id. at 175.
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Concern for state rights climbed to the forefront in the Court’s
reasoning.37 As Justice O’Connor noted, “[T]he Constitution simply
does not give Congress the authority to require the States to
regulate.”38 Further, the Court addressed problems created by the
take-title provision that apply equally to instances of conditional
spending.
First, the Court recognized the risk of disconnecting political
accountability when Congress compels states to regulate.39 If states
freely choose to take action, then state officials rightly remain
accountable to their own citizens. But when Congress coerces states
to act, as found in New York, citizens may wrongly hold state officials
politically accountable for Congress’s political agenda.40 In other
words, when state officials cease to act under their volition and
instead carry out the orders of Congress, voters may nonetheless
blame or credit state officials.
Second, because coercion misdirects political accountability, the
concern arises that coercion may promote political abuse. Federal
officials possess an incentive to compel states to act because they can
shift responsibility and its inherent burdens to the states. Without the
coercion principle, members of Congress might overly rely on coercive
federal spending programs and take refuge in a political safe harbor.
Meanwhile, state legislators could plausibly deflect blame to Congress,
further blurring the lines of political accountability. The New York
Court anticipated the potential degradation into political tennis,
especially in the context of radioactive waste disposal.41 It responded
by asserting that state officials cannot consent to a congressional
overreach.42 Though the Court did not strike down an exercise of
conditional spending, it fortified the coercion principle recognized in
Dole. These developments provided the foundation for the Supreme
Court’s more rigorous approach to conditional spending in NFIB.
37.

See, e.g., id. at 188 (“States are not mere political subdivisions of the
United States. . . . The positions occupied by state officials appear nowhere
on the Federal Government’s most detailed organizational chart.”).

38.

Id. at 178.

39.

Id. at 168 (“[W]here the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished.”).

40.

Id. at 168–69.

41.

Id. at 182 (“[T]he facts of these cases raise the possibility that powerful
incentives might lead both federal and state officials to view departures
from the federal structure to be in their personal interests. Most citizens
recognize the need for radioactive waste disposal sites, but few want
sites near their homes. . . . [I]t is likely to be in the political interests of
each individual official to avoid being held accountable to the
voters. . . .”).

42.

Id. at 182.
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B.

Crossing the Line: NFIB v. Sebelius

NFIB garnered immense attention for its political ramifications.
After the passing of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act43
(ACA), many states challenged the validity of the individual mandate
and the Medicaid expansion. Before the ACA, the Medicaid program
offered conditional funding to the states to assist pregnant women,
children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled in
obtaining medical care.44 Under the ACA, states receiving funding
were required to extend coverage to any person under the age of
sixty-five with an income below 133% of the federal poverty line at
the beginning of 2014.45 As noted by Chief Justice Roberts, the
provision would substantially increase the number of adults whom
states must cover because states previously, on average, covered only
unemployed parents who made less than thirty-seven percent of the
poverty line and employed parents who made less than sixtythree percent.46
The Supreme Court produced three different opinions on the
Medicaid expansion issue. Two opinions, representing seven Justices,
concluded that the expansion was unconstitutionally coercive. Justices
Ginsburg and Sotomayor concluded otherwise. Taken together, these
opinions revitalize the coercion principle.47 The opinions provide some
guidance as to how the coercion principle will be applied going
forward, but that guidance is limited by the tailoring of the opinions
to the ACA. Thus, to facilitate a discussion about the future of the
coercion principle, the following subsections detail the reasoning of all
three opinions.
1.

Chief Justice Roberts’s Opinion

Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and
Kagan, found that Congress unconstitutionally exercised its spending
power through the Medicaid expansion’s conditional funding scheme.48
The opinion advanced two bases for finding the provisions
43.

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).

44.

42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2006).

45.

§ 2001, 124 Stat. at 271 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1396a beginning in 2014).

46.

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012)
(citing Martha Heberlein et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid
and the Uninsured: Performing Under Pressure 11 (2012)).

47.

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts
Court, 58 Duke L.J. 345, 372–73 (2008) (predicting the Roberts Court
will shy away from the coercion principle’s problematic line-drawing
analysis).

48.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (explaining that although Congress has broad
spending power, it cannot surprise states with certain conditions).
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unconstitutional. One focused on the coercive amount of funding; the
other emphasized the condition’s retroactive effect.
Chief Justice Roberts first confronted the issue of coercion. He
contrasted the amount of federal Medicaid funding at stake under the
ACA with the highway funding subject to the drinking age condition in
Dole.49 More specifically, he contrasted the funding in proportion to
overall state expenditures. In Dole, less than one percent of total
South Dakotan expenditures was conditioned, whereas the ACA
conditioned over ten percent of an average state’s budget.50 Because
the ACA placed its conditions on a greater proportion of overall state
expenditures, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the condition was
“economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but
to acquiesce.”51
Chief Justice Roberts’s second basis builds on the premise that
the Medicaid expansion would achieve a “shift in kind, not merely
degree.”52 In other words, the ACA changes Medicaid in a manner
that turns it into a program distinct from its prior form.53 Branching
from that premise, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the ACA
unconstitutionally placed a retroactive condition on funding.54 In his
view, the ACA added an unexpected condition onto the Medicaid
funding that states had already accepted. The ACA’s conditions were
not a mere amendment to Medicaid that States could have
anticipated when they joined the program. The Court derived the rule
against retroactive conditions from Pennhurst as a corollary of the
requirement that Congress “unambiguously express” funding
conditions.55 By enacting a shift in kind, Congress imposed new

49.

Id. at 2604–05.

50.

Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, State
Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2010–2012 State
Spending 11 tbl.5 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006)).

51.

Id. at 2605.

52.

Id.

53.

Chief Justice Roberts reached this conclusion primarily by emphasizing
the change in design away from covering the four discrete categories of
people originally covered: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy
families with dependent children. Id. at 2606 (“Under the Affordable
Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health
care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below
133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for
the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”); see
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (2006).

54.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606.

55.

Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17,
25 (1981)).
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conditions that states could not have anticipated when they opted
into the program.
Despite some ambiguity regarding the relationship between the
two bases in Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, both operate as a
sufficient, independent basis for finding conditional spending
unconstitutional. The Dole framework requires satisfaction of all four
of its prongs.56 The Pennhurst “unambiguously express” requirement
composes one prong within the framework.57 Thus, failure to meet
that requirement alone would have rendered the provision
unconstitutional. But Chief Justice Roberts declined to narrowly rest
the holding solely on the Pennhurst requirement. Instead he
reinvigorated the coercion principle, which Dole treated as a separate
spending constraint. This move strongly suggests that the Court will
more thoroughly scrutinize congressional conditional spending in the
future. However, Chief Justice Roberts expressly declined to elaborate
where the line that separates encouragement and unconstitutional
coercion lies.58
2.

The Adjoined Opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito

The opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito59
echoed much of Chief Justice Roberts’s coercion analysis. It
emphasized the amount of funding at stake, though the dissenting
Justices relied more broadly on budget figures. They argued that, as a
practical matter, the “sheer size of this federal spending program in
relation to state expenditures” makes it very difficult for states to
replace lost federal funds through tax increases or other budget cuts.60
Both the dissenting Justices and Chief Justice Roberts used figures

56.

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).

57.

Id. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s citation to Pennhurst in explaining
the “shift in kind” theory, some commentators mistakenly attribute the
theory to coercion analysis. See, e.g., Megan Ix, Note, National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Misguided
Application and Perpetuation of an Amorphous Coercion Theory,
72 Md. L. Rev. 1415, 1441–43 (2013) (treating the retroactivity of a
“shift in kind” as a new criterion of coercion).

58.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (“We have no need to fix a line either. It is
enough today that wherever that line may be, this state is surely
beyond that.”).

59.

Id. at 2657 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). This
Note refers to this opinion as the “adjoining opinion” in recognition of
the fact that seven of the Justices found the Medicaid expansion
unconstitutional. In addition, this Note refers to Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito as the “dissenting Justices.”

60.

Id. at 2663.
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from the same report to show how important federal Medicaid
funding is to states’ total spending.61
To highlight state reliance on Medicaid funding, the adjoining
opinion mentioned that federal funding for elementary and secondary
education equals only 6.6% of total state spending versus almost
twenty-two percent for Medicaid.62 Importantly for this Note, while
federal Medicaid funding to states certainly exceeds education
funding, the opinion did not suggest how the Court would rule on
coercion in respect to federal education spending. Education funding
simply served as the ideal contrast because it is the next biggest
federal funding item to states.
The adjoining opinion included an argument relating to the
difficulty of replacing federal funding. When the federal government
supports a grant program by levying a heavy tax, states lose the
ability and the willingness to tax their constituents further.63 Under
such a program, a new tax in a nonparticipating state must tack on
to federal taxes paid by residents, who then subsidize the federal
program in other states.64 State legislators would incur a higher
political cost by deciding to tax an already heavily tapped tax base.
Thus, especially in situations of widespread national acceptance,
states face immense pressure to acquiesce even if they deem a
program inefficient and ineffective.65 Altogether, the adjoining opinion
stresses the states’ reliance on federal funding and the impracticality
of replacing the federal funds to accomplish the same objective.
The dissenting Justices additionally argued that the stated goal
and structure of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion evidenced intent to
61.

See, e.g., id. at 2662–63 (citing State Expenditure Report:
Examining Fiscal 2010–2012 State Spending 7 (2012)) (noting that
in 2010 the federal government granted $223 billion to the states for
preexpansion Medicaid, which equaled nearly twenty-two percent of all
state expenditures).

62.

Id. at 2663 (citing State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal
2010–2012 State Spending 7, 16 (2012)).

63.

Id. at 2661–62; see also Reply Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid
at 19, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
(No. 11-400) (“Coercion is measured by a State’s ability to withstand
the loss of the inducement at stake.”).

64.

The fact that all states participate in Medicaid does not defeat this
point. A state’s residents pay federal taxes regardless of its participation
in Medicaid. Thus, the state must use the federal dollars collected from
its residents or lose those funds. A state desiring to opt out of Medicaid
may be compelled to stay in the program to avoid losing out on money
collected from its own tax base. In other words, the rationale underlying
the coercion principle applies both when a state first decides to accept
federal conditional funds and when a state later decides whether to
continue accepting those funds.

65.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62.
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coerce.66 To the dissenting Justices, the ACA’s expressed goal and the
lack of backup scheme demonstrated Congress’s knowledge that it had
designed an offer the states could not refuse.67 Overall, though, they
relied primarily on budgetary arguments about the amount of
Medicaid funding at stake and the concerns underlying coercion.
3.

Justice Ginsburg’s Dissent

Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor, wrote the lone
opinion upholding the Medicaid expansion.68 Because the Court
divided seven to two on this issue, this opinion bears little weight.
Moreover, Justice Ginsburg focused her criticism on the majority’s
shift-in-kind premise, not the coercion principle.69 She found Medicaid,
including the ACA’s expansion, to be a single program.
Justice Ginsburg mentioned that Congress has amended the
Medicaid program more than fifty times, sometimes significantly.70
Because the federal government provides much of the funding for the
ACA expansion, the financial burdens born by the states change
minimally; thus, the Act’s Medicaid expansion does not significantly

66.

Id. at 2664–66. First, the expansion’s goal was to provide near-universal
health care coverage, which Congress can accomplish only with full state
acceptance. Id. at 2664. If states refused to expand their Medicaid
programs to include all adults below 133% of the federal poverty line,
then the ACA’s goal would be impeded. Id. at 2665. Second, Congress
omitted any type of backup scheme for when states declined the funding
for the expansion. The adjoining opinion noted that Congress would
have created a backup if it thought states could refuse to accept funding
to implement a health benefit exchange. Id.

67.

Id. at 2666. The federal government argued that Congress’s anticipation
of full participation was based on the notion that the expansion offered
exceedingly favorable terms to the states. However, Justice Scalia
rejected the argument because of the phased-in costs that participating
states would bear. But Justice Scalia’s reasoning that congressional
intent helps to prove coercion is dubious. Congressional intent to design
a conditional funding program to coerce states to act should not affect
the analysis of whether the scheme actually accomplished that effect.
The Supreme Court defines constitutional boundaries, not Congress.

68.

Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part). Because Justice Ginsburg
would have upheld the Medicaid expansion as a constitutional exercise
of Congress’s spending power, this Note refers to her opinion as the
dissent for purposes of this issue.

69.

Id. at 2630 (“Congress is simply requiring States to do what States have
long been required to do to receive Medicaid funding: comply with the
conditions Congress prescribes for participation.”).

70.

Id. at 2631–32 (placing particular emphasis on coverage expansions for
pregnant women and the large increase in annual federal Medical
expenditures over the long run).
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differ from past expansions.71 In addition, Congress expressly reserved
“[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the Medicaid
program.72 And states acknowledged that right by agreeing to change
their respective plans in accordance with changes in federal law.73 To
Justice Ginsburg, Congress exercised its spending power within the
parameters of Pennhurst by merely amending an existing program.
Besides the separate-program premise, Justice Ginsburg took issue
with Chief Justice Roberts’s contention that the terms of the
conditions were not unambiguously expressed. Based on state
acknowledgment of Congress’s express authority and the history of
Medicaid expansions, she argued that states could hardly be surprised
by the ACA’s terms. Moreover, she asserted that the analysis should
focus on the ACA’s expression of conditions, not the conditions
expressed in the original Medicaid legislation.74
Lastly, she flatly declined to engage in the sort of statistical
federalism analysis that defined the other opinions. In response to
Justices Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s coercion analyses,
Justice Ginsburg contended that the political question doctrine
precludes the Court from engaging in the analysis due to the lack of
judicial competence.75

II. Federal Involvement in Elementary
and Secondary Education
Federal involvement in elementary and secondary education is
hardly an overnight development. Paralleling Congress’s steady
expansion into health care, Congress has increasingly claimed
education as a prerogative it shares with the states. Initially, the
federal government did little more than voice encouragement for
education. Today, Congress serves as a key player rather than a
booster. This evolution invokes the primary purpose of the conditional
spending principle: to prevent Congress from overstepping the bounds
of federalism. Defining where those boundaries lie demands
consideration of how the federal role in education has evolved. Thus,
to inform an application of the coercion principle to education
spending, this Part summarizes the key steps in Congress’s expansion
into education.

71.

Id. (mentioning that federal funds will cover all of the costs for newly
eligible recipients in 2014 and will phase down to ninety percent by 2020).

72.

42 U.S.C § 1304 (2006).

73.

See 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(i) (2013).

74.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2638.

75.

Id. at 2640–41 (“The coercion inquiry . . . appears to involve political
judgments that defy judicial calculation.”).
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A.

Tradition of State Control

The Tenth Amendment declares that “[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”76 For
much of America’s history, states led the development of public
education, in part because the Constitution does not enumerate
education as a federal power.77 Based on an understanding that
Congress lacked power to regulate education, states generally detailed
the structure of their educational systems in their own constitutions.78
In fact, each state’s constitution at the very least mentions
education.79
In America’s early years, Congress occasionally influenced public
education through indirect initiatives.80 Shortly before the adoption of
the Constitution, the federal government passed a series of ordinances
to organize the development of the Northwest Territory.81 For
example, a 1785 ordinance82 required each newly created township to

76.

U.S. Const. amend. X.

77.

Stephen B. Thomas et al., Public School Law: Teachers’ and
Students’ Rights 2 (Stephen D. Dragin ed., 6th ed. 2009).

78.

James D. Koerner, Who Controls American Education? A
Guide for Laymen 79 (1968); see also William E. Thro, An Essay:
The School Finance Paradox: How the Constitutional Values of
Decentralization and Judicial Restraint Inhibit the Achievement of
Quality Education, 197 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 477, 482 (2005)
(reviewing the types of education provisions included in state
constitutions from single clauses promising free education to detailed
descriptions of the state’s education system).

79.

Michael D. Barolsky, Note, High Schools Are Not Highways: How Dole
Frees States From the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left
Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 742 (2008); see also Peter Enrich,
Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform,
48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (remarking that each state, except
arguably Mississippi, includes an “education clause” in its constitution).
The current version of Mississippi’s constitution reads “[t]he legislature
shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, maintenance and
support of free public schools upon such conditions and limitation as the
Legislature may prescribe.” Miss. Const. art. VIII, § 201.

80.

See Koerner, supra note 78, at 4–5 (listing federal laws implicating
education up through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27).

81.

See, e.g., Continental Congress Ordinance of May 20, 1785
(ascertaining the mode of disposing of Lands in the Western Territory),
reprinted in 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 375 (John
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933).

82.

Id.
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reserve a section of land for a public school.83 More than eighty years
and the Civil War passed before Congress created the Department of
Education in 1867.84 Initially not a cabinet-level department, the
agency lacked the policy-making authority commonly held by its
European counterparts.85 Instead, the department’s mission centered
on collecting statistics and distributing information.86 A later example
of indirect influence comes from the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act
of 1944.87 The Act, known as the G.I. Bill, and its successors88
financed college and vocational educations for numerous military
veterans without actually regulating the educations themselves.89
The federal government held little more than a fringe role in
education until the 1960s.90 During the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century, public schooling spread dramatically across the
states without much direction or assistance from the federal
government.91 From 1890 to 1920, the number of students attending
83.

Id. Two years later, the federal government provided that “[r]eligion,
morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged.” Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III, reprinted in
1 U.S.C. LVII, LIX (2012).

84.

Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 158, § 1, 14 Stat. 434, 434.

85.

William J. Reese, America’s Public Schools: From the Common
Schools to “No Child Left Behind” 45–46 (Stanley I. Kutler ed.,
updated ed. 2011); see also Koerner, supra note 78, at 9–12
(explaining the limited informational purposes of the agency and
detailing its troubled beginnings).

86.

§ 1, 14 Stat. at 434 (“[T]here shall be established . . . a department of
education, for the purpose of collecting such statistics and facts as shall
show the condition and progress of education in the several States and
Territories, and of diffusing such information respecting the organization
and management of school and school systems, and methods of
teaching . . . .”).

87.

Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 38 U.S.C.) (commonly known as the G.I. Bill).

88.

See generally Cassandria Dortch, Cong. Research Serv., GI
Bills Enacted Prior to 2008 and Related Vetrans’
Educational Assistance Programs: A Primer 4 tbl.1 (2012)
(summarizing the educational assistance programs, beginning with the
G.I. Bill).

89.

See, e.g., § 400, 58 Stat. at 287–90 (establishing the mechanics of the
G.I. Bill’s education program, including the states’ ability to designate
qualified educational and training institutions).

90.

Thomas et al., supra note 77, at 12 (describing funding laws that were
passed to provide financial assistance to schools).

91.

Reese, supra note 85, at 45–46, 63–64. The ideal of the common school,
particularly the free high school, motivated the expansion. Notable
advocates for the common school, namely Horace Mann, William Harris,
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American high schools increased from two hundred thousand to
nearly two million.92 In the early twentieth century, America led
western nations in postsecondary enrollment rates.93 The decentralized
structure of America’s education system accelerated its rapid
expansion.94 Still today, upwards of fourteen thousand school districts,
ninety-six thousand schools, and 3 million teachers continue to make
key decisions that most directly impact the classroom.95
B.

“War on Poverty” Era: Expansion of the Federal Role in Education

By the 1960s, the tradition of state dominance in education
started to erode. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
196596 (ESEA) represents the beginning of increased federal
involvement in education. The original ESEA doubled the amount of
federal aid to education and steadily increased the proportion of total
education spending supplied by the federal government.97 The law
aimed to supplement state efforts to educate economically
disadvantaged students.98 To this end, under the original ESEA,

and John Dewey, argued that common schools would promote social
equality, reduce crime, and reinforce good morals.
92.

Edward A. Krug, The Shaping of the American High School
11, 439 (1964).

93.

Claudia Goldin, The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership:
Virtues of the Past, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 263, 265 (2001).

94.

Id. at 284. Goldin explains that even if a significant minority supported
postsecondary education expansion, this desired expansion would not
occur in a centralized system until support grew to a national majority. In
a decentralized system, however, the significant minority could expand
postsecondary education in localities where it constituted a majority. Id.
In the decentralized system, it follows that because localities expanding
postsecondary education would gain a comparative advantage over
neighboring area, a “race to the top” situation would ensue.

95.

Susan H. Fuhrman et al., Educational Governance in the United States:
Where Are We? How Did We Get Here? Why Should We Care?, in
The State of Education Policy Research 41, 41 (Susan H.
Fuhrman et al. eds., 2007).

96.

Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C.).

97.

Thomas et al., supra note 77, at 12.

98.

See sec. 2, § 201, 79 Stat. at 27 (designating as Title I the Act of
September 30, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-874, 64 Stat. 1100, creating a separate
Title II, and declaring in the new Title II that United States policy is “to
provide financial assistance (as set forth in this title) to local educational
agencies serving areas with concentrations of children from low-income
families to expand and improve their educational programs”); Indep.
Review Panel, Improving the Odds: A Report on Title I from
the Independent Review Panel 2 (2001).
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extended federal funds to school districts servicing high proportions of
children from low-income families.99
ESEA established relatively modest conditions for receipt of
federal funding. Schools receiving funding were obligated to use the
money to extend remedial reading and math instruction services.100
States retained the option to decline federal funds for specific
programs as opposed to risking all federal education funding for a
refusal to participate in a single program.101
In the decades following the passage of the original ESEA,
Congress slowly broadened the federal government’s role in
education.102 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
1975103 required states receiving federal funds to effectuate policies to
provide students with disabilities a “free appropriate public
education.”104 In 1979, Congress reconstituted the U.S. Office of
Education, which had been demoted to an executive office one year
after its creation,105 into the cabinet-level Department of Education.106
The National Commission on Excellence in Education’s landmark
report, A Nation at Risk,107 incited nationwide concern for education
and effectively launched a movement focusing on developing higher

99.

Sec. 2, §§ 203–204, 79 Stat. at 28–30.

100. See sec. 2, § 205(a), 79 Stat. at 30–31 (limiting the ways local
educational agencies can use ESEA grants and setting basic reporting
requirements).
101. Sec. 2, § 210, 79 Stat. at 33–34.
102. See John F. Jennings, Title I: Its Legislative History and Its Promise, in
Title I: Compensatory Education at the Crossroads 1, 14–15
(Geoffrey D. Borman et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the history of ESEA
and its reauthorizations).
103. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (amending the Education and
Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601, 84 Stat. 121, 175 (1970))
(current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012)).
104. Sec. 5, § 612, 89 Stat. at 780 (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)
(2012)).
105. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Overview of the U.S. Department of
Education 3 (2010).
106. Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 201,
93 Stat. 668, 671 (1979). Although the Act committed additional federal
resources to education, it did so with the understanding that none of the
Department’s programs would allow federal officers to exercise any
control over curriculum, program of instruction, and other matters of
local school administration such as personnel or textbooks. § 103,
93 Stat. at 670–71.
107. Nat’l Comm’n on Excellence in Educ., A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform (1983) [hereinafter A Nation
at Risk].
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standards.108 In 1994, Congress pushed along the standards movement
with two laws. First, the Goals 2000: Educate America Act109
extended federal money to states for drafting their own academic
standards.110 Second, the Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994111
reauthorized and amended ESEA in line with the standards-based
reform principles outlined in Goals 2000.112
C.

Modern Scheme: No Child Left Behind

Riding the coattails of the standards movement,113 Congress
enacted the currently controlling version of ESEA, the No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001114 (NCLB). The law passed easily through
Congress with bipartisan support and markedly increased federal

108. See Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American
School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining
Education 24–30 (2010) (voicing mostly support of A Nation at Risk
and crediting the report with launching the standards movement in
education). Setting the tone for the report, the first paragraph straightly
stated that “the educational foundations of our society are presently being
eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a
Nation and a people.” A Nation at Risk, supra note 107, at 9.
109. Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (amending ESEA) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
110. § 306(a), (c), 108 Stat. at 160, 162–64. But see Ravitch, supra
note 108, at 17–19 (arguing that most states drafted vague, unsubstantial
standards following a successful attack on history standards drafted by
University of California, Los Angeles historians). An opinion piece in the
Wall Street Journal, written by the former chairperson of the National
Endowment for the Humanities, triggered a national media firestorm that
led the Clinton administration to abandon the national standards. See
generally Lynne V. Cheney, Op-Ed., The End of History, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 20, 1994, at A22 (strongly criticizing the national standards for
political bias); see also RAVITCH, supra note 108, at 17 (discussing
Cheney’s argument the effects). On the other hand, Ravitch, who viewed
the state standards as flawed but fixable, argues that the nationalstandards battle discouraged states from writing substantive standards
that would polarize constituents. Id. at 19.
111. Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
112. See sec. 101, § 1111, 108 Stat. at 3523 (allowing the standards created
by states under Goals 2000 to satisfy the requirement that states adopt
“challenging content standards and challenging student performance
standards”).
113. See Ravitch, supra note 108, at 29–30 (contending that assessmentbased reforms replaced the standards movement in the mid-1990’s upon
the states’ unwillingness to develop demanding, concrete standards).
114. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 20 U.S.C.).
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control over education.115 NCLB touches essentially every program
created under the prior ESEA and goes further.116
Similar to prior versions of ESEA, NCLB’s funding scheme
demands that states satisfy statutory provisions to receive federal
funds.117 While stakeholders and interest groups have taken issue with
a number of the provisions added by NCLB, no provisions have
generated more animosity and controversy than those pertaining to
academic assessment.118 To receive NCLB funds, each state must
develop “challenging academic content standards and challenging
student academic achievement standards” for “mathematics, reading
or language arts, and . . . science.”119 From those standards, states
must design and administer annual standardized assessments to all
students in grades three through eight.120 The assessment results then
serve as a primary indicator of yearly performance within a single,
statewide accountability system that meets an array of federal
requirements.121 Under the accountability system requirements,
schools must achieve “adequate yearly progress” (AYP), a statedefined threshold,122 or incur sanctions. Potential sanctions include
115. Lizette Alvarez, House Votes for New Testing to Hold Schools
Accountable, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2001, at A1, A20. The bill passed
the House of Representatives 384 to 45.
116. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No Child Left Behind: A Desktop
Reference 9 (2002).
117. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 6316(a)(1) (2006). For previous ESEA conditions,
see supra Part II.B.
118. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 107-063, pt. 1, at 1240 (2001) (“[W]e remain
concerned that the bill goes too far in its reliance on standardized
testing.”); Michael Winerip, On Education: Teachers, and a Law That
Distrusts Them, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2006, at B8 (expressing the
concern that time-intensive standardized testing detracts from students’
opportunity to pursue subjects tailored to their interests). See generally
Ravitch, supra note 108 (questioning the accuracy of standardized
testing results and the perverse incentives high-pressure testing creates
for teachers and administrators).
119. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A),(C) (2012).
120. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(vii).
121. Id. § 6311(b)(2). After disaggregating and categorizing the score data to
facilitate tracking of specific populations, states must publicly release the
assessment results. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(C)(xiii), (h)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (listing
the information states must include on their annual report cards).
122. Id. § 6311(b)(2)(A)–(C). Under § 6311(b)(2), states possess the
incentive to set AYP standards low so their constituent districts can
maximize their federal funding, which places less pressure on the state
to provide supplemental funding. As a result, the standards developed
pursuant to NCLB have been varied and often disappointingly low. See
G. Gage Kingsbury et al., Nw. Evaluation Ass’n, The State of
State Standards: Research Investigating Proficiency Levels
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forcing schools to offer in-district public school transfers,123 requiring
the provision of “supplemental educational services,”124 and
restructuring.125
Critical to any discussion of coercion, NCLB’s conditions function
differently from prior ESEA conditions in two important respects.
First, some of NCLB’s requirements apply to all schools in a state,
including those not receiving federal money.126 For schools that do not
receive federal funding as bargained-for consideration, those
requirements seemingly transform from conditions into regulations.127
Second, at least in practice, NCLB conditions funding on the
satisfaction of a bundle of its provisions.128 Unlike the original ESEA,
states lack the option to select which specific federal programs they
would independently adopt.129 This bundling raises the potential that
a state would rationally accept what it views to be an unwanted
in Fourteen States 11, 19 tbl.7 (2004) (noting that the states’
proficiency levels for standards and assessments vary greatly).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (2012).
124. Id. § 6316(b)(5)(B).
125. Id. § 6316(b)(8)(B). After a school fails to meet AYP for three
consecutive years, a school district must either (1) reopen the school as
a public charter school, (2) replace all or most of the staff who are
relevant to the failure to make AYP, (3) contract with an entity such as
a private management company, (4) turn over the school’s operations to
the state, or (5) implement “[a]ny other major restructuring of the
school’s governance arrangement that makes fundamental reforms.” Id.
126. Ronald D. Wenkart, The No Child Left Behind Act and Congress’
Power to Regulate Under the Spending Clause, 174 WEST’S EDUC. L.
REP. 589, 590 (2003). Wenkart explains that NCLB required states
receiving Title I funds to develop academic standards that must apply
to all public schools in the state whether or not they receive those funds.
Id. ESEA did demand a state plan for funds received under Title II, but
those plans needed to set forth only how the state will administer and
protect the funds for textbooks and other education material.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10,
sec. 5, § 203(a), 79 Stat. 27, 37–38. Thus, the ESEA state plans did not
apply to and regulate localities through the proxy of the state.
127. See id.
128. See Barolsky, supra note 79, at 737–40, 745 (explaining that while
NCLB’s text merely calls for the Secretary of Education to withhold
payment without defining what payment to withhold, Department of
Education practice has forced states to comply with all NCLB
provisions to receive federal funding); Gina Austin, Note, Leaving
Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act Usurps States’
Rights, 27 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 337, 367 (2005) (asserting that
noncompliance with NCLB could result in the loss of a state’s Title I
funding and twice that amount in other categorical funds).
129. See sec. 2, § 210, 79 Stat. at 33–34 (allowing for withholding of Title I
funds for failing to meet certain Title I requirements).
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regulation because it amounts to a cost associated with a beneficial
program.
Several states have challenged NCLB’s provisions. In 2005,
Connecticut sued the Secretary of Education after she refused to allow
the state to deviate from NCLB’s assessment regime.130 The
Connecticut Mastery Test scheme at issue differed from the NCLB
scheme in several respects, including the grade-levels of the test
takers.131 Though the court dismissed the action for lack of
jurisdiction, the case exemplifies states’ distaste for losing control over
their education systems. Shortly after the Connecticut suit, the
Fairfax County School Board decided not to give four thousand
recent immigrant students the same NCLB-mandated test given to
English-speaking students.132 Despite initial support from Virginia’s
Superintendent of Public Instruction, the district administered the
test after the federal Deputy Secretary of Education threatened to
withhold all of the county’s federal educational assistance.133 Though
Virginia and Connecticut’s struggles epitomize states’ frustration with
NCLB, other states have resisted as well.134
As NCLB remains in effect, the federal government has sought
other means to influence education. Interestingly, the financial crisis
of the late 2000s created an opportunity for the Obama
administration to place its stamp on education. The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,135 which aimed at stabilizing
130. Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Conn. 2006), aff'd as
modified sub nom. Connecticut v. Duncan, 612 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
131. Nicole Liguori, Leaving No Child Behind (Except in States That Don’t
Do As We Say): Connecticut’s Challenge to the Federal Government’s
Power to Control State Education Policy Through the Spending Clause,
47 B.C. L. Rev. 1033, 1054 (2006) (noting that Connecticut requires
public school students in fourth, sixth, and eighth grades to take the
Connecticut Mastery Test, while NCLB requires that students be tested
every year from third through eighth grade and at least once in tenth
through twelfth grade).
132. Maria Glod, Fairfax Resists “No Child” Provision: Immigrants’ Tests in
English at Issue, Wash. Post, Jan. 26, 2007, at B1. School board
members felt that administering the test to immigrant students would
set them up for failure. One member stated, “It is wrong for our
students to take a test they are predisposed to fail.” Id.
133. Maria Glod, Fairfax Schools Concede on Testing: Comprise Made on
Limited English, Wash. Post, Apr. 19, 2007, at B1.
134. See, e.g., Jeff Archer, Connecticut Files Court Challenge to NCLB,
Educ. Wk., Aug. 31, 2005, at 23, 27 (mentioning that Utah passed a
measure giving its state education law precedence over federal law and
that Colorado law offers financial protection to districts opting out of
NCLB’s requirements).
135. Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).

598

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Coercion by the Numbers

the American economy, created the Race to the Top program.136
Similar to NCLB, the program influenced states to adopt a federally
endorsed set of education reforms, but it employed a different
mechanism to exact its influence. The Secretary of Education awarded
Race to the Top funds—$4.35 billion137—based on state applications
in a competitive process. Forty states applied in the program’s first
round, and only two were awarded funding.138 The second round
resulted in ten winners from a pool of thirty-five applicants.139 A much
smaller third round concluded in December 2011.140
The full implications of the Race to the Top program extend
beyond the scope of this Note. While the program prompted states to
adopt certain reforms, the program does not trigger the same coercion
issues as NCLB. Many states opted to not participate. And of the
states that applied, less than a third received funding.141 Relevant to a
coercion assessment of NCLB, Congress separately authorized and
funded Race to the Top. Thus, the program has not diverted federal
money away from NCLB’s conditional funding scheme.
In September 2011, a decade after Congress passed NCLB, the
Obama administration announced a NCLB waiver plan that would
waive states’ failure to meet the requirement that all students achieve
proficiency in math and language arts by 2014.142 To obtain a waiver
under the plan, states had to agree to separate conditions related to
academic standards and intervention in troubled schools. The waivers
go into effect for the 2013–14 school year, with a one-year extension
136. § 14006, 123 Stat. at 283–84. The Act also included a much larger
educational appropriation that was distributed based on preexisting
statutory formulas. § 14002(a)(2)(A)(i), 123 Stat. at 279–80.
137. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Race to the Top Program Executive
Summary 2 (2009).
138. Alyson Klein, Obama Uses Funding, Executive Muscle to Make OftenDivisive Agenda a Reality, Educ. Wk., June 13, 2012, at 1.
139. Id.
140. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Department of Education Awards
$200 Million to Seven States to Advance K–12 Reform (Dec. 23, 2011);
see also Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1832, 125 Stat. 38, 163–
64 (appropriating funding for the third round).
141. An argument could be made that Congress coerces the states with this
type of competitive grant arrangement. The prospect of funding itself
has a value. Similar to tort damages for loss of opportunity, the value of
potential funding could be discounted by the probability that the state
will receive limited or no funding. However, under the Supreme Court’s
current jurisprudence, much more money would need to be at stake
before coercion would become an issue.
142. Michele McNeil & Alyson Klein, Obama Outlines NCLB Flexibility,
Educ. Wk., Sept. 28, 2011, at 1.
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option.143 States receiving a waiver must still comply with other
NCLB conditions. While the U.S. Department of Education denied
some state’s waiver requests, at least forty-one states have obtained
these waivers.144 Ironically, the waiver’s purported added flexibility
has transformed into another avenue of federal muscle, as the
Department seeks to impose higher requirements for states to obtain
future NCLB relief.145
D.

Pending Reauthorization of the ESEA-NCLB Regime

As of April 2013, Congress has neglected to meaningfully advance
reauthorization legislation.146 NCLB attracted bipartisan support in
the unique political environment that followed September 11, 2001,
with members of Congress supporting it as an act of partisan unity.147
Congress enacted NCLB for an initial term of five years that expired
in 2007, but the law remains in effect until Congress modifies or
eliminates it.148
Given Congress’s recent aversion to long-term compromises, the
reauthorization process promises to be contentious and drawn-out.149

143. Id.
144. Michele McNeil, Arne Duncan Attaches More Strings to NCLB Waiver
Renewal, Educ. Wk.: Blogs (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:00 PM),
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2013/08/barring_reaut
horization_this_m.html.
145. Id. (reporting that Secretary of Education Arne Duncan will impose
tougher requirements for states to obtain future NCLB waivers).
146. See Alyson Klein, Top K–12 Leader in Congress Sets Departure Date,
Educ. Wk., Feb. 6, 2013, at 20 (describing ESEA renewal as “longstalled” and mentioning that Senator Harkin, a leader on education issues
and serving his final term, may focus more attention on reauthorizing the
Individuals with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012))).
147. Elizabeth H. DeBray, Politics, Ideology, & Education:
Federal Policy During the Clinton and Bush Administrations
117 (2006).
148. Regina R. Umpstead & Elizabeth Kirby, Reauthorization Revisited:
Framing the Recommendations for the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act’s Reauthorization in Light of No Child Left Behind’s
Implementation Challenges, 276 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2012).
149. For an in-depth analysis of the political and institutional considerations
impeding ESEA reauthorization, see Elizabeth DeBray & Eric A.
Houck, A Narrow Path Through the Broad Middle: Mapping
Institutional Consideration for ESEA Reauthorization, 86 Peabody J.
Educ. 319, 334–35 (2011). DeBray and Houck correctly predicted that
the 112th Congress would not pass an ESEA reauthorization bill after
analyzing factors like congressional polarization, degree of party control,
new leadership and committee composition, and the rising influence of
education think tanks. Id. Many of these impediments apply equally to
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Congressional lassitude will add to the already conflicting views about
what is best for American education.150 In March 2010, the Obama
administration released A Blueprint for Reform: The Reauthorization
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act151 in an attempt to
guide congressional deliberations. The Blueprint’s approach maintains
many of NCLB’s core policies while incorporating some of the reforms
endorsed in the Race to the Top program.152 The Blueprint also calls
for a continuation of the Race to the Top program.153
If Congress incorporates Race to the Top in the renewed ESEA,
then less money may be distributed via the traditional conditional
spending model. A decrease in conditional funding under ESEA will
weaken the argument that it is unconstitutionally coercive. However,
the Blueprint has sparked little progress,154 and recent budgetary
trends suggest that federal conditional spending for education will not
decrease.155
This Note’s coercion analysis incorporates NCLB spending figures.
Unless ESEA reauthorization dramatically cuts federal conditional
spending for education, the same case for unconstitutional coercion
will persist. Conversely, increased federal conditional spending under
ESEA will only strengthen the case for coercion.

the current 113th Congress, suggesting that ESEA will continue to dwell
in a state of congressional purgatory.
150. Compare Benjamin Michael Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and the Shifting Federal Role
in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 131–32 (2011) (advocating for
principle-based guidelines over a set of rigidly defined best practices),
with Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative
Enforcement Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1653, 1719–20 (2007) (contending that the federal government
should build on the set of best practices that it currently provides).
151. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., A Blueprint for Reform: The
Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act (2010).
152. Id. at 3–6 (noting that the Blueprint builds on the following key
priorities: “(1) College- and Career-Ready Students; (2) Great Teachers
and Leaders in Every School; (3) Equity and Opportunity for All
Students; (4) Raise the Bar and Reward Excellence; [and] (5) Promote
Innovation and Continuous Improvement”).
153. Id. at 36 (stating that the Blueprint is modeled after the Race to the
Top program).
154. In 2011, Senators Tom Harkin and Michael Enzi sponsored a
reauthorization bill that adopted many of the Blueprint’s suggested changes,
but the bill was soundly defeated. See Klein, supra note 138, at 20.
155. See discussion infra Part IV.C; see also Umpstead & Kirby, supra
note 148, at 24–25 (contending that the reauthorization debate has been
framed as building on the NCLB’s foundational principles).
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III. Federal Courts and Conditional Funding
for Education
In recent years, federal courts have sought to reign in federal
overreaching in education by invoking the conditional spending
doctrine. The following three cases suggest that federal courts will be
willing to apply NFIB’s analysis to a case involving conditional
spending for education.
The Supreme Court rigorously applied the conditional spending
doctrine in Arlington Central School District Board of Education v.
Murphy.156 In Murphy, parents who prevailed on a claim filed under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act157 (IDEA) sought to
recover fees for an education consultant’s services used in the
action.158 The relevant section of IDEA provided that the district
court “may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs” to
parents prevailing in a claim under the statute.159 At issue was
whether the statute provided for fee shifting of payments to experts.
The Court strictly enforced Pennhurst’s requirement that
Congress impose funding conditions unambiguously.160 Justice Alito
averred that when evaluating whether a condition was stated
“unambiguously,” the relevant reference point is the state officer who
decides whether to accept conditional federal funds.161 In other words,
courts cannot incorporate congressional legislative history into its
analysis of spending conditions.
In 2009, the Sixth Circuit addressed a NCLB conditional spending
issue in School District of Pontiac v. Secretary of the United States
Department of Education.162 The plaintiff school districts and
education associations claimed that the so-called unfunded mandates
provision163 does not require them to comply with NCLB requirements
when federal funds do not cover the costs of doing so.164 The Sixth
156. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
157. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012).
158. 548 U.S. at 294.
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (2012).
160. 548 U.S. at 304.
161. Id. at 296.
162. 584 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
163. 20 U.S.C. § 7907(a) (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
to authorize an officer or employee of the Federal Government to
mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or school’s
curriculum, program of instruction, or allocation of State or local
resources, or mandate a State or any subdivision thereof to spend any
funds or incur any costs not paid for under this chapter.”).
164. 584 F.3d at 256.
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Circuit found that the provision failed the Pennhurst requirement
because “the only thing clear about § 7907(a) is that it is unclear.”165
This decision and Murphy foreshadowed part of the Court’s ruling in
NFIB by strengthening the “unambiguously stated” requirement of
federal conditional spending.
More on point for this Note, one recent federal court decision
specifically contemplated the coercion argument with regard to federal
education spending. The Fourth Circuit, in Virginia Department of
Education v. Riley,166 focused on an IDEA provision that demands
that states provide a “free appropriate public education” to all
children with disabilities, including those suspended or expelled from
school.167 Virginia, an IDEA-funds recipient, had in effect a policy of
withholding free educational services from disabled students who had
been expelled for behavior unrelated to their disabilities.168 The U.S.
Department of Education threatened to withhold all of Virginia’s
IDEA funding for two years—a total of $60 million—if it did not
change the policy. Virginia refused.169
Ultimately, the court decided narrowly that the provision’s
language did not create a condition.170 But the court continued to
comment that if the provision was a condition, then the withholding
of Virginia’s entire $60 million annual IDEA grant would surpass the
“relatively mild encouragement” permitted in Dole.171 Similarly to
Chief Justice Roberts’s and the dissenting Justices’ NFIB opinions,
the Riley court noted the large amount of funding at stake; however,
it rejected a percentage-based argument that the IDEA funding
amounted to only five percent of Virginia’s spending to educate
children with disabilities.172 Instead, the court contrasted the absolute
amount of funding at stake with the small number of students
affected by the provision.173

165. Id. at 277.
166. 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
167. Id. at 561 (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012))
168. 106 F.3d at 560.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 568.
171. Id. at 569.
172. Id. at 569–70.
173. Id. at 569 (“Here, in stark contrast [to Dole], the Federal Government
has withheld from the Commonwealth 100% of an annual special
education grant of $60 million because of the Commonwealth’s failure to
provide private educational services to less than one-tenth of one
percent (126) of the 128,000 handicapped students for whom the special
education funds were earmarked.”).
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The federal courts’ recent treatment of conditional education
spending indicates that NFIB’s coercion reasoning is more than an
aberration applicable to only the Medicaid program. Instead, NFIB
conforms to federal courts’ increased skepticism of federal conditional
spending in education cases. As shown by these cases and NFIB, the
Supreme Court appears primed to strike down federal conditional
spending for education as unconstitutionally coercive.

IV. Application of Post-NFIB Conditional Spending
Doctrine to Federal Education Funding Scheme
Chief Justice Roberts’s NFIB opinion relied on two separate
theories from Dole to find the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional:
(1) the expansion imposes an unexpected condition on prior funding174
and (2) the expansion involves so much money that states could not
refuse the offer.175 Using the Supreme Court’s NFIB reasoning, this
Part explains how the stage has been set for the Court to find that
federal conditional spending for education violates the latter of these
two theories: coercion.
A.

Coercion by the Numbers

The NFIB Court displayed a willingness to find an exercise of
conditional spending in violation of the coercion principle, but where
exactly the coercion line is drawn lingers as an open question. The
Court established that Congress crosses the line when a conditional
funding grant exceeds a certain threshold. As noted by the dissenting
Justices, federal aid for elementary and secondary education is the
next largest federal funding item to states after Medicaid.176 Under
NFIB, if any other conditional spending item crosses from
encouragement into unconstitutional coercion, it is education
spending. But NFIB introduces a few wrinkles into Dole’s coercion
analysis. Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting Justices’ analyses
significantly overlap but diverge in a few relevant respects as well.
Chief Justice Roberts focused on (1) how large of an item
Medicaid is in the average state’s budget and (2) the proportion of
Medicaid covered by federal funds.177 Combining those two items,
Chief Justice Roberts derived the statistic that drove his analysis: the

174. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012).
175. Id. at 2605.
176. Id. at 2663 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting).
177. Id. at 2604 (majority opinion) (“Medicaid spending accounts for over
20 percent of the average State’s total budget, with federal funds
covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”).

604

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Coercion by the Numbers

percentage of funding at risk compared to a state’s total spending for
all purposes.178
The dissenting Justices’ adjoining opinion adds several
quantitative considerations.179 It emphasized the absolute amount of
Medicaid funding directed to the states by Congress.180 The opinion
then mentioned how much of the nation’s Medicaid expenditures
derive from federal funding.181 Lastly, it joins Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion in highlighting federal Medicaid grants as a percentage of a
states’ total spending, cherry-picking figures from a few select states—
Arizona and South Dakota—to support its coercion finding.182 The
state-specific focus contrasts with Chief Justice Roberts’s use of
budget figures averaged across all fifty states.
Nuances aside, both opinions primarily considered the funding at
stake in proportion to states’ total expenditures.183 Chief Justice
Roberts declared that “[t]he threatened loss of over 10 percent of a
State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning.”184 Both opinions
cited an annual report by the National Association of State Budget
Officers (NASBO).185 Using data from other NASBO reports, the
application of NFIB’s analysis to NCLB conditional funding generates
178. Id. at 2604–05.
179. Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and
Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 62 (2013) (“These factors in their totality supported
the plurality’s determination that states are effectively ‘locked in’ to
Medicaid. But the conflation of financial and other considerations
muddles the coercion analysis; the Court failed to indicate which of these
factors is decisive for a law’s constitutional status.”) (citation omitted).
180. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2662–63 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (“In 2010, the Federal Government directed more than
$552 billion in federal funds to the States . . . Of this, more than
$233 billion went to pre-expansion Medicaid.”) (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 2663. In addressing states’ reliance on federal conditional spending
for certain categorical purposes, the dissenting Justices treat elementary
and secondary education as a distinct category of funding from higher
education. See, e.g., id. (referring to elementary and secondary
education as a single funding item). The Court rests this distinction on
the fact that funding for these respective categories derives from
different legislative schemes.
182. Id. at 2663–64.
183. Id. at 2663 (“But the sheer size of this federal spending program in
relation to state expenditures means that a State would be very hard
pressed to compensate for the loss of federal funds by cutting other
spending or raising additional revenue.”); id. at 2604–06 (majority
opinion).
184. Id. at 2605.
185. Nat’l Ass’n of State Budget Officers, 2010 State Expenditure
Report: Examining Fiscal 2009–2011 State Spending (2011).
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a figure below Chief Justice Roberts’s ten percent coercion mark.
From 2002 to 2010, NCLB conditional funding to the states as a
percentage of total state expenditures peaked in 2003 at 2.11%.186
This percentage still greatly exceeds—by a multiple of eleven—
the 0.19% of state expenditures at stake in Dole.187 After 2003, the
percentage of total state expenditures from NCLB conditional funding
has gradually dipped, even though NCLB funding has increased. By
2010, the $25.1 billion in NCLB funding to states equated to only
1.55% of states’ total expenditures.188 These percentages do not rise to
the levels at issue in NFIB, but the NFIB Court did not set a
minimum threshold for coercion.189 NCLB’s conditional funding in
relation to overall state expenditures places its coerciveness between
Dole’s 0.19% and NFIB’s 10.0%. Thus, by applying NFIB’s budgetary
analysis to NCLB’s federal conditional spending for education, an
argument emerges: conditional spending for education as it exists
under NCLB today is unconstitutionally coercive.
Budgetary arguments beyond the Court’s focus in NFIB support
this argument as well. While Chief Justice Roberts and the dissenting
Justices measure reliance using total state expenditures as a base
value, state gross domestic product (GDP) provides a better measure.
Reliance hinges on a state’s ability to fund a program, not its
willingness to fund it. If the state can fund a program to a certain
level but declines to do so, it nonetheless maintains its ability to

186. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, NCLB Funding 4 (2010) (2003 NCLB funding of
$23.8 billion); Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 2004 State
Expenditure Report 6 tbl.1 (2005) (2003 total state expenditures of
$1.13 trillion). 2003 NCLB funding comprised almost one-tenth of what
states spent for elementary and secondary education, which totaled
$245.6 billion. Id. at 16 tbl.7.
187. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2664.
188. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, supra note 186, at 3; Nat’l Assoc. of State
Budget Officers, State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal
2010–2012 State Spending 7 tbl.1 (2012), available at
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/State%20Expenditure%20Repo
rt_1.pdf (2010 total state expenditures of $1.62 trillion).
189. But see Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius:
The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577, 622–25
(2013) (arguing that the NCLB funding figures are insufficient to show
coercion because they are closer to the figures in Dole rather than
NFIB). Professor Pasachoff likewise discusses the post-NFIB treatment
of NCLB. On the issue discussed in this Note—labeled the “economic
dragooning” theory by Pasachoff—she relied on the 1.5% figure’s
relative proximity to Dole’s 0.19% as the crucial indicator that mollifies
coercion concerns. Id. This argument shortchanges the sizeable
difference between those two figures. And because the Court did not
specify when funding becomes coercive, any figure above 0.19% yields a
plausible argument for coercion.
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decline federal funding.190 States with lower total expenditures per
capita may have the ability to tax and spend more on education, but
they choose not to. As opposed to total spending, state GDP—a
measure of a state’s total output—better indicates the size of a state’s
tax base, and thus its ability to pay, because it does not incorporate a
state’s overall inclination to tax and spend for all purposes.
Using state GDP as a base value reveals states’ growing reliance
on federal education funding, which in turn indicates states’ limited
ability to choose whether to accept federal funding. Federal education
funding as a percentage of state GDP has doubled since the time of
Dole with the most dramatic increases occurring after NCLB
implementation. From 1987 to 2011, the percentage rose from 0.22%
to 0.47%.191 In 2001, the year of NCLB’s enactment, the percentage
sat at just 0.26%.192 While these percentages may appear low, it is
important to consider that the base value is the states’ total economic
output in a year, not just government spending.
As of 2001, only thirty-three states had seen an increase in federal
education funding as a percentage of state GDP since 1987. But all
states—with the exception of Maine—experienced an increase from

190. The Fourth Circuit has raised the concern that comparing federal
conditional funding to state budgets would create a perverse inventive
for states to spend less in areas where they receive federal monies in an
attempt to establish coercion. Va. Dep’t. of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d
559, 570 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (per curiam).
191. Karen A. Farrell, Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers,
1989 State Expenditure Report 28 (1989) (1987 federal education
funds to states of $10.3 billion); Interactive Data, Bureau of Economic
Analysis (last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_
regional.cfm (select “Begin using the data . . .” button; then “Gross
domestic product by state”; then “Gross domestic product”; then “SIC”;
then “All industry total”; then select United States as the area; then
select 1987 as the year) (1987 combined state GDP of $4.6 trillion);
Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 2002 State
Expenditure Report 16 tbl.7 (2011 federal education funds to states
of $70.5 billion); Interactive Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis (last
visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm
(select “Begin using the data…” button; then “Gross domestic product
by state”; then “Gross domestic product”; then “NAICS”; then “All
industry total”; then select United States as the area; then select 2011
as the year) (2011 combined state GDP of $14.9 trillion).
192. Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, 2002 State Expenditure
Report 16 tbl.7 (2003) (2001 federal education funds to states of
$26.8 billion); Interactive Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013), http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.
cfm (select “Begin using the data…” button; then follow “Gross domestic
product” hyperlink in the first dropdown list; then choose “NAICS”; then
select “All industry total”; then select each state individually; then select
2001 as the year) (2001 combined state GDP of $10.22 trillion).
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1987 to 2011.193 Perhaps the most impressive transformation happened
in Montana, which received only 0.06% of its GDP in federal
education funds in 1987 but brought in 0.66% in 2011.194 More than
half the states during 1987–2011 doubled their federal education funds
in relation to state GDP.
While the NFIB court did not rely on GDP comparisons, it
incorporated reliance into its coercion analysis. By accounting for
states’ ability, as opposed to willingness, to tax and spend, these GDP
comparisons more accurately show how states rely more on federal
education spending after the implementation of NCLB’s conditional
funding scheme. The greater reliance boosts the argument that
current levels of conditional education spending deprive states of a
real choice in accepting the federal funds.
Moreover, district and circuit courts may opt to use GDP for the
comparative analysis instead of state expenditures. For example, the
Fourth Circuit, in Riley, raised the concern that comparing federal
conditional funding to state budgets would create a perverse incentive
for states to spend less in areas where they receive federal funds in an
attempt to establish coercion.195 Using state GDP as the reference
point for coercion mitigates this concern. But while the GDP
comparison seems to reveal more about the expansion of federal
conditional spending in education, the argumentative force behind
this budgetary analysis is essentially the same regardless of the
financial reference point. Ultimately, the numbers land between Dole
and NFIB.
B.

Application of the Coercion Principle’s Rationales

The budget figures alone make a compelling case for coercion.
Even so, a reconsideration of Dole’s rationales with respect to
conditional spending for education reinforces the budgetary arguments
made in the prior section, thus placing added pressure on federal
courts to find the spending unconstitutionally coercive.
First, the confluence of increased federal control through
conditional spending and the tradition of local and state control196
complicates the electorate’s task of determining whom to hold
responsible. Voters intuitively connect education policy to local and
state decision makers. Even voters that acknowledge the federal
government’s increased role in education must undertake the
exhausting task of tracing federal funding to know who is responsible

193. See supra note 191.
194. See supra note 191.
195. Riley, 106 F.3d at 570. Using state GDP as the reference point for
coercion analysis absolves this concern.
196. See discussion supra Part II.A–C.
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for what. As a result, few voters have a firm grasp of the division of
policy authority between federal, state, and local authorities.
Adding to the confusion, substantial federal involvement in
education policy adds not a second but a third layer into the
equation. To properly assess whom to hold accountable in education
and to what degree, a voter must understand the fluid involvement of
school administrators, local school board members, state school board
members, state legislators, governors, members of Congress, the U.S.
Department of Education, and the President.197 The involvement of
more decision makers additionally enables all of them to maintain
plausible deniability. In other words, federal involvement creates more
outlets for deflecting blame. Accordingly, both policy makers and
policy implementers gain political insulation.198 And as the electorate’s
ability to administer accountability diminishes, meaningful democratic
participation in education dwindles.
Second, the modern coercion principle aims to protect state
choice. Behind Dole’s language distinguishing “encouragement” from
“coercion” lies the fear of state reliance on federal money.199 When
states build a reliance on federal money, they begrudgingly conform to
federal policies. When that happens, funding deprives the states of
any practical choice in turning down funds, which in turn enables the
federal government to enlist the states in implementing its own
policies. NFIB repeated these concerns.200 In discussing the
requirement that states voluntarily accept the terms of federal
spending, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[r]especting this
limitation is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does
not undermine the status of the States as independent sovereigns in
our federal system.”201 In addition, the dissenting Justices underscored
the reliance concern when comparing federal Medicaid funding to
total state expenditures.202
197. Assuming a person votes for two state legislators, five local board of
education members, and a single state board of education member, the
voter must decipher the actions of ten policy makers and their political
opponents. In addition, the voter must consider the influence of the
state’s governor and the President. If voters regularly fail to shoulder
this burden, then the people controlling education gain insulation from
whom they serve.
198. See Greve, supra note 7, at 593–94 (arguing that this lack of political
accountability explains the general ineffectiveness of cooperative policies,
which, despite their limitations, are increasing in use).
199. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (stating its decision
recognizes the potential danger of depriving states of realistic choice
when accepting conditional funds).
200. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012).
201. Id. at 2602.
202. Id. at 2663–64 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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Fueling the concern for state reliance, conditional spending
diminishes the alternatives available to a state. Citizens are subject to
taxation from federal, state, and local governments. Given that a
state’s tax base is limited, any tax imposed and collected by the
federal government diminishes a state’s ability to collect taxes from
that base.203 State legislators incur steeper political costs for taxing
that base as well. Because heavy federal taxation diminishes a state’s
ability to demand more money from its citizens, Congress deprives
that state of its ability to choose whether to accept federal funding
when it offers an overly large amount of money.204 This concern
heightens in tight fiscal times. In metaphorical terms, by offering an
especially large carrot, Congress effectively pulls everything else off
the menu. Choice does not exist when there are no alternatives.
The state-choice rationale for the coercion principle applies
anytime states receive a large amount of conditional spending. As
mentioned in Part IV.A, federal education spending granted to the
states has grown as a share of state GDP since the time of Dole.
A potential waiver of funding conditions, like those granted by
the Obama administration for NCLB, does not mitigate these
concerns.205 When accepting conditional funding, states do not know
203. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 Colum.
L. Rev. 1911, 1935–39 (1995) (pointing out that since the adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment states can effectively tax its citizens’ income
and property only after the federal government has taken its cut).
Because of the federal government’s superior position, it gains the
ability to offer states conditional funding that states could have
otherwise obtained by directly taxing their citizens. So when Congress
uses conditional spending, it effectively offers states a return of their
own citizens’ money with the requirement that they follow certain
conditions. Id.
204. The dissenting Justices raised this point in NFIB. 132 S. Ct. at 2661–62
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
205. See Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism
Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of
Engagement, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 91, 161–65 (2012). Copeland
acknowledges that the NFIB Court based its coercion analysis on the
statutory framework at the time of enactment. However, he argues that
doing so ignored the modern realities of bureaucratic cooperative
governance. He asserts that the Court should have instead engaged in a
more contextualized coercion analysis. While the Court has analogized
much of its conditional spending jurisprudence to classical contract law,
a consideration of relational contract principles to the relationship
between the federal and state governments would have begged for the
same type of contextualized analysis desired by Copeland. See James W.
Fox Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship,
54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1, 32 (2003) (“The relational emphasis of
democratic citizenship makes it a natural counterpart to relational
contract theory. In one sense, the political community is itself seen as a
form of ongoing long-term contract.”).
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whether a waiver will eventually be offered, when it will be offered, or
to which conditions the waiver will apply. Because states do not know
this information, they must operate on the premise that the federal
government will enforce all the conditions of its spending. And while a
waiver sounds like a clean escape from a condition, states may be
required to comply with other conditions to receive the waiver.206
Budgetary arguments and the rationales for the coercion principle
combine to push federal conditional funding for education into
susceptible territory. By finding the ACA’s Medicaid provisions
unconstitutionally coercive, the Supreme Court has placed the
constitutionality of federal education funding in serious doubt.
C.

The Future of Federal Education Funding: An Upward Trend

As of April, 2013, the prospects for a serious coercion-based
challenge to NCLB are minimal. With the reauthorization of ESEA
pending before Congress, NCLB slowly approaches the end of its life
cycle. ESEA reauthorization would undermine any successful
challenge to NCLB. And as previously discussed, the coerciveness of
NCLB conditional funding has diminished since its inception. But
future conditional funding schemes for education—including the
reauthorized version of ESEA—will need to comply with the Supreme
Court’s post-NFIB coercion doctrine. Thus, the relevant focus shifts
away from NCLB and to the potential conditional funding scheme of
the pending ESEA reauthorization.
Budgetary trends suggest that the reauthorized ESEA will grant
an even greater amount of conditional funding in proportion to states’
total budgets, increasing its vulnerability to a coercion challenge postNFIB. Specifically, these trends reflect increased federal funding of
education that is distributed through the states. Since the time of
Dole, the proportion of state education expenditures financed by
federal funding has increased markedly. Dramatic increases in federal
education funding in absolute terms has fueled this financial shift.
Federal funding for elementary and secondary education more than
doubled between 1985 and 2010, rising from $32.9 billion to
$88.8 billion.207 In addition to overall expenditures, federal education
funding comprises a large portion of states’ elementary and secondary
education spending. In the aggregate, twenty-one percent of states’
elementary and secondary education spending in 2010 came from
federal funds.208
206. See supra text accompanying notes 142–45 (noting that NCLB waivers
apply to only select provisions and that future waivers will entail
tougher requirements).
207. Nat’l Center for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Digest
of Education Statistics 2011 543 tbl.D (2012).
208. Nat’l Assoc. of State Budget Officers, supra note 188, at 16
tbl.7. The proportion of federal funding within a budget category, such
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V. Legislative Changes to Reconcile
Federal Education Legislation with NFIB
The coercion principle restrains Congress from overstepping its
Spending Clause power to financially twist the arms of the states.
Courts invoke the principle to preserve to the vertical segregation of
duties envisioned under the Tenth Amendment. In seeking to preserve
state control over certain policy areas, one should ask what rationales
exist for maintaining state control. To further that line of questioning,
this Part first discusses the justifications for preserving state and local
control over education. In accordance with those justifications, this
Part then offers recommendations for ESEA reauthorization to
harmonize it with the coercion principle.
A.

Problems with Federal Involvement in Education

Often the justifications for state control over an area derive from
a tradition of state control. As discussed above, education represents
a prime example of an area rooted in state control. Even in NFIB, the
dissenting Justices used primary and secondary education for a
hypothetical to illustrate how the coercion principle protects “areas
traditionally governed primarily at the state or local level.”209 But
other rationales supplement the case for state and local control over
elementary and secondary education. The crux of these other
rationales is that local and state entities are better suited to govern
education.
To begin, spreading authority over three levels of government—
local, state, and federal—fractures decision making. Federal
involvement entails an added layer of information sharing and
requires decision makers to notice and react to the actions of other
authorities. Of the three levels of government, the federal government
is the least apt for promulgating responsive education policies. The
top-down approach inherent to federal regulation of elementary and
as education, indicates reliance in situations where a state will struggle
to replace lost federal funding within that category. For instance, states
where constituents disfavor education compared to other public services
will likely not replace lost federal education funding with additional
state revenue. Because the state cannot replace the education funds, a
higher proportion of federal education funding to state education
expenditures serves as the best indicator of reliance. A state relying on
federal money for forty percent or more of its education expenditures
will abide by the conditions on that money if the state’s citizens will not
support revenue increases specifically for education. But for states with
a neutral or positive willingness to fund education, the proportion of
federal education funding to total state expenditures serves as a better
indicator of reliance.
209. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012)
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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secondary education creates the largest disconnect between the
decision makers and the actual education environment.210 In
implementing education policy, individual states and localities benefit
from greater understanding of local conditions and a more
homogeneous citizenry.211 Thus, more localized control enables the
tailoring of education to a community’s individual needs.
When the federal government imparts education policy, as
opposed to state and local entities, the policy’s implementation will
necessarily involve a wider range of actors.212 State and local
implementers are subject to different political climates and confront
different challenges than federal policy makers, which induces motley
execution of the same policy.213 This effect subverts the idea that
federal education policy achieves consistency. Any remaining hope of
consistent reform implementation weakens further at the school
level.214
Broad, overarching federal education policies spurn the spectrum
of different educational views and philosophies. Thanks to great
thinkers like Noah Webster, Thomas Jefferson, and John Dewey,
numerous theories about the relationship between education and
democracy pervade modern education. The nature of this relationship
defines the core objectives of public education, which in turn dictate
the means for achieving those objectives.215 Given the fundamental
differences between these conflicting educational philosophies, citizens
should have the ability to meaningfully choose between them. But the
electoral dilution of federal elections erodes the chance for citizens to
210. Barolsky, supra note 79, at 741.
211. Shannon K. McGovern, A New Model for States as Laboratories for
Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1519, 1533 (2011).
212. Superfine, supra note 150, at 93.
213. See id. at 94–95.
214. Jennifer A. Mueller & Katherine H. Hovde, Theme and Variation in the
Enactment of Reform: Case Studies, in The Implementation Gap:
Understanding Reform in High Schools 21, 21 (Jonathan A.
Supovitz & Elliot H. Weinbaum eds., 2008) (observing significant policy
implementation differences between fifteen high schools); see also
Richard Weatherly & Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and
Institutional Innovation: Implementing Special-Education Reform,
47 Harv. Educ. Rev. 171, 193 (1977) (reflecting on the importance of
school level implementation of federal education law).
215. Diane Ravitch, Education and Democracy, in Making Good Citizens:
Education and Civil Society 15, 26–27 (Diane Ravitch & Joseph P.
Viteritti eds., 2001). For example, Thomas Jefferson advocated for public
education to enable people to protect their own individual freedom from
tyranny. Id. at 16–17. In contrast, Noah Webster desired to use
education to mold society and promote cultural cohesion. Id. at 16.
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advocate for the type of education provided in their communities.216
Thus, education decisions should be localized to minimize electoral
dilution and give citizens the ability to democratically shape
education policy.
In addition, federal education policy stunts the benefits of local
experimentation, commonly termed as using the “states as
laboratories.” Over America’s educational history and still today,
policy makers, teachers, administrators, and scholars have rarely
uniformly supported the same policies.217 Current disagreements
surrounding the wisdom of high-stakes assessments, merit-based pay,
and school choice strengthen the case for allowing states to pursue
their own policies.218 The alternative—imposing federal reforms—risks
nationalizing and entrenching popular yet unproven reforms.219
Moreover, implementing nationally homogeneous reforms hinders the
development of a research base from which informed policy could be
derived.
Despite the benefits of concentrating control over education policy
in local and state entities, an ideal allocation of authority still
contemplates some federal involvement. By engaging in an oversight
role, the federal government can advance national educational
interests that escape state and local stakeholders.220 But for the
reasons outlined in this section, federal influence should be minimal.

216. A system of state, as opposed to local, control would entail similar
electoral dilution but to a much lesser degree. Citizens stand a better
chance of influencing education policy at the state level. This Note does
not address the allocation of authority between state and local entities
because it is beyond the scope of the U.S. Constitution.
217. See Reese, supra note 85, at 336 (connecting Americans’ dissimilar
education policy preferences to different views on the primary objectives
of education); Liguori, supra note 131, at 1051–52 (reviewing divergent
views about the wisdom of NCLB).
218. Charles Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of
Teachers and Principals, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1345, 1378 (2007) (“More
experimentation and evaluation . . . are clearly needed if good policies
are to be developed . . . .”); see also Maris A. Vinovskis, Missed
Opportunities: Why the Federal Response to A Nation at Risk was
Inadequate, in A Nation Reformed? American Education 20
Years After A Nation at Risk 115, 126, 130 (David T. Gordon ed.,
2003) (spotlighting the deficient research base available for deciding
education policy).
219. See McGovern, supra note 211, at 1541–42.
220. See id. at 1542–46 (identifying global competitiveness and interstate
resource inequality as examples of federal interests not addressed by
state and local stakeholders).
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B.

Recommendations

The current NCLB conditional funding scheme and the likely
scheme of its successor raise serious coercion concerns. Assuming
Congress continues to expand its role in education—as budgetary
trends suggest it will—the utilization of conditional funding to
achieve that expansion will receive heightened judicial scrutiny in
light of NFIB.
As mentioned by four of the Justices in NFIB—a case about
health care—states retain the ultimate ability to choose education
policies.221 Part V.A provides a few reasons for why this arrangement
is ideal. However, modern conditional spending schemes for education
threaten this arrangement. Therefore, to help restore the states’
ability to choose their education policies and to improve political
accountability, Congress should consider taking the following steps to
reconcile ESEA with the Supreme Court’s coercion jurisprudence.
1.

Extend More Funding Through Competitive Grant Programs

The competitive funding model used in the Race to the Top
program operates in accordance with the coercion principle in its
current form. Because states choose whether to apply and what
measures to enact to boost their applications, the competition model
allows states greater ability to choose their education policies.222 By
distributing more money through a renewed Race to the Top
program, Congress can rely less on the traditional conditional scheme
used by ESEA and its various reincarnations. Lowering the amount of
conditional funding will in turn diminish the chances of a coercion
ruling.
Nonetheless, grant competitions still allow the federal government
to influence education policy. For example, the Race to the Top
formula awarded forty points for the adoption of common
standards,223 which advanced the adoption of the Common Core State
Standards by at least forty-six states.224 Thus, coercion issues would
221. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2662 (2012)
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
222. For a number of reform recommendations for the Race to the Top
program, see McGovern, supra note 211, at 1550–54. McGovern explains
that the initial program’s prioritization of specific education reforms
compelled states to adopt the federally-endorsed reforms. Sharing my
concern for federally driven education policy, she advocates that the
federal government can serve a more proper role of innovation facilitator
by instead assessing grant applications in an unbiased manner. This
kind of financing can be especially beneficial on a national scale because
of the informational externalities produced by local experimentation.
223. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., supra note 137, at 7.
224. See Michele McNeil, 46 States Agree to Common Academic Standards
Effort, Educ. Wk., June 10, 2009, at 16 (reporting that all states have

615

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 2·2013
Coercion by the Numbers

arise if the amount of funding at stake through a program exceeds a
certain level much higher than what Race to the Top currently
awards. Money that citizens pay to fund the program is money that
the states cannot collect to directly fund education. Yet courts would
struggle to apply the coercion principle to a grant competition
because of difficulties in determining the amount of funding at stake.
2.

Attach Tiered Conditions to Funding

As opposed to typical all-or-nothing conditions, tiered conditions
would receive more favorable treatment by the courts. Under NCLB,
noncompliance with one provision may allow the Department of
Education to pull all of an entity’s funding.225 States desiring to
deviate from funding conditions must consider the harsh consequences
of doing so. Thus, all-or-nothing conditions restrain state policy
makers from deviating from those conditions even when compelling
reasons exist for the deviation.
Recall in Riley, the court mentioned that withholding Virginia’s
entire $60 million annual IDEA grant because it did not comply with
a funding condition that affected only a small percentage of students
would have been unconstitutionally coercive.226 Tiered conditions may
have solved this problem.
Congress can avoid some coercion issues by simply unbundling the
amount of funding at stake for each condition. As an alternative to
all-or-nothing conditions, Congress may dictate the withholding of a
certain amount of conditional funds for failure to comply with a
specific condition. Reducing the financial punishment for not
complying with a condition accordingly reduces the conditional
spending’s coerciveness. Tiered conditions provide a middle ground
between all-or-nothing conditions and a scheme in which only the
funding related to a condition is at stake for that condition.227

Conclusion
In ruling the ACA’s Medicaid provisions unconstitutionally
coercive in NFIB, the Supreme Court transformed the coercion
principle from a mere rhetorical threat into a credible, federalismbased restraint on Congress’s spending power. However, the decision
stopped well short of precisely demarcating mere encouragement from
agreed to common standards except for Alaska, Missouri, South
Carolina, and Texas).
225. See supra Part II.C.
226. Va. Dep’t of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 569 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(per curiam).
227. By assigning different amounts for its funding conditions, the federal
government can use tiered conditions to prioritize its provisions.
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impermissible coercion. As Congress increasingly relies on conditional
spending to accomplish its policy objectives, the importance of
knowing what divides encouragement from coercion grows.
Over a span of decades, Congress has steadily expanded its
influence in elementary and secondary education through conditional
spending. NCLB, the most recent authorization of ESEA, has offered
states large amounts of conditional funding while demanding
controversial reforms in return. Using NFIB’s approach to coercion,
NCLB’s conditional funding falls in a middle ground below the
funding at stake in NFIB but above the funding at stake in other
coercion cases. Applying the rationales underlying the coercion
principle to elementary and secondary education reinforces the
argument for coercion.
Therefore, if the reauthorized ESEA continues the trend of
increased conditional spending for education, the legislation will be
vulnerable to coercion challenges. To avoid these challenges, and to
restore states’ control over education, Congress should increasingly
employ two alternative devices for distributing education funding:
competitive grant programs and tiered conditions. Without these or
other changes, the reauthorized ESEA will likely prompt the Supreme
Court to reaffirm its newfound commitment to the coercion principle.
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